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ABSTRACT 
Deployment of high-speed passenger rail services has 
occurred around the world in densely-populated corridors, 
often with the effect of either creating or enhancing a unified 
economic “megaregion” agglomeration. This paper will review 
the technical characteristics of a variety of megaregion 
corridors, including Japan (Tokyo-Osaka), France (Paris-
Lyon), and Germany (Frankfurt-Cologne), and their economic 
impacts. There are many lessons to be drawn from the 
deployment and ongoing operation of high-speed passenger 
rail service in these corridors for other countries now 
considering similar projects, such as the US and parts of the 
European Union. 
       First, we will review three international cases, describing 
the physical development of each corridor as well as its 
measured impacts on economic development. In each case, the 
travel time reductions of the high-speed service transformed 
the economic boundaries of the urban agglomerations, 
integrating labor and consumer markets, while often 
simultaneously raising concerns about the balance of growth 
within the region. Moreover, high-speed travel within the 
regions has had important implications for the modes and 
patterns of travel beyond the region, particularly with respect 
to long-distance air travel. An example is the code-shared rail-
air service between DeutscheBahn and Lufthansa in the 
Frankfurt-Cologne corridor.  
Next, we will examine the implications of these 
international experiences for high-speed rail deployment 
elsewhere in the world, particularly the US and Portugal, one 
of the EU countries investing in high-speed rail. Issues 
considered include the suitability of high-speed passenger rail 
service in existing megaregions as well as the potential for 
formation of megaregions in other corridors. By understanding 
the impact of high-speed passenger service on economic 
growth, labor markets, urban form, and the regional 
distribution of economic activity, planners can better anticipate 
and prepare countermeasures for any negative effects of high-
speed rail. Examples of countermeasures include 
complementary investments in urban and regional transit 
connections and cooperation with airlines and other 
transportation service operators. 
High-speed passenger rail represents a substantial 
investment whose implementation and ultimate success 
depends on a wide range of factors. Among them is the ability 
of planners and decision-makers to make a strong case for the 
sharing of benefits across a broad geography, both within and 
beyond the megaregion (and potential megaregion) corridors 
where service is most likely to be provided. This paper 
provides some useful lessons based on international 
experiences. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
HSR is becoming an increasingly important and popular 
form of passenger transportation infrastructure, as roads and 
airports become more congested and greenhouse gas levels 
increase.  Since the introduction of the first high-speed rail 
(HSR) line in Japan in 1964, HSR has been gaining acceptance 
worldwide, with new lines in operation or under construction 
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in several EU countries, China, South Korea, and Taiwan, as 
well as lines under serious considered in other countries.  
The implementation of high-speed rail lines plays an 
important role in reshaping the travel patterns and activities of 
people and consequently changing the ways cities develop. 
Apart from the goals of increasing transportation infrastructure 
capacity and providing a “green” transport alternative, the 
motivation to develop HSR system for many countries has also 
been promotion of economic growth and regional 
development. Traditionally, the direct economic impacts of 
HSR and other transport investments are assessed through a 
benefit-cost analysis (BCA). However, there are also indirect or 
wider development impacts that the traditional BCA may not 
capture. 
These impacts are the main focus of the paper—
specifically, the potential for megaregion or megalopolis 
formation - an integrated economic urban complex – created 
by fusion of multiple cities connected at high-speed of 200-300 
km/h (124-186 mi/h).1 Megalopolises can have many positive 
economic impacts stemming from larger labor markets, larger 
commercial markets, expanded individual daily activity zones, 
and so forth.  Ross (2009) presents a megaregion as a 
geography that can be more effective than cities alone in 
meeting “economic and social challenges.”2 Prud'homme 
(1997) links the size of the city’s labor market to the city’s 
productivity. The larger the labor market, both the firm and the 
employees have higher probabilities of getting what they want. 
A larger labor market also justifies and facilitates 
specialization of workers and jobs thus increasing productivity. 
Considering this theory, the megalopolis may offer a larger 
labor market relative to the existing labor markets of city pairs 
where service is being considered, and therefore contribute to 
increased productivity. 
The development impacts from HSR may also be negative. 
For example, HSR can disadvantage the smaller urban areas 
located between the main HSR stations. Puga (2001) notes that 
“a better connection between two regions not only gives firms 
in a less developed region better access to the inputs and 
markets of more developed regions,” but also can harm them 
by reallocating economic activity to the richer regions. This is 
also true for cities. Therefore, we draw upon international 
experiences to understand what the improved accessibility 
from the HSR means for the economic activity, labor markets 
and distribution of development impacts in small- and 
medium-sized cities and regions. 
These impacts are directly relevant to the U.S. and 
Portugal. For example, the US government is making 
investments in HSR connections for major city pairs in 
Florida, California, and the Midwest, among other places. 
Meanwhile, the Portugal government intends to deploy HSR 
                                                        
1 Gottman, J. 1961; Pickard, J.P. 1962; Hall, P. 2006 and 2009; Lang, R. and 
Knox, P. 2009; and Blum et al. 1997. 
2 Ross, C.L. 2009, p. 5. 
on the 297 km (185 mile) corridor between Lisbon and Porto, 
the country’s two largest cities, in 75 minutes, with 
intermediate stops in 4 smaller cities. 
First, we review transportation literature on economic 
development effects of HSR investments (including economic 
geography and megacities). Next, we present case studies of 
international HSR corridor experiences, specifically Tokyo-
Osaka in Japan, Paris-Lyon in France, and Frankfurt-Cologne 
in Germany. The case studies explore the phenomenon of 
“megalopolis” formation along the selected corridors as a 
result of the HSR link and to find evidence of economic 
development effects on urban areas along the corridors, both 
positive and negative.  The findings are then applied to 
analyze the planned Lisbon-Porto HSR corridor in Portugal; 
and the possible emergences of megalopolis forms and the 
associated implications for HSR deployment elsewhere in the 
world are discussed. 
METHODOLOGY 
The case study approach is largely qualitative and 
descriptive, supported where appropriate with syntheses of 
quantitative analyses of empirical evidence. Cases were 
selected to include countries with sufficient experience 
operating HSR systems to allow for the development effects of 
HSR to occur.  Empirical evidence was collected through 
review of available data as well as existing literature from 
Japan, France, and Germany, both before and after deployment 
of HSR. Key indicators for measuring economic effects of 
transportation investments were identified.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing theoretical literature identifies a number of 
potential economic development impacts of HSR investment, 
many of which go beyond traditional impacts such as travel 
time savings and transport cost reductions. These include 
changes to the spatial location of economic activity, reductions 
in regional inequalities, larger labor and consumer markets, 
and increased productivity levels. Some of the potential 
negative impacts include a loss of economic activity in less 
developed and/or less accessible regions, and thus uneven 
allocation of growth. 
A number of existing studies assess the economic 
development implications of transportation in general. 
Banister et al. (2001) examines whether transportation 
investments yield any “additional development benefits” at the 
regional and local levels besides the direct gains from travel-
time savings. Puga (2001) and Krugman explore the effect of 
“reduction in transport costs” on “the spatial location of 
economic activities.” Puga also notes that transport 
infrastructure improvements are one of the main instruments 
for “reducing regional inequalities.” 
Studies assessing the development impacts of HSR find 
that HSR contributes to further centralization and 
concentration of most economic activity in already developed 
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areas.  For instance, HSR line in Spain induced spreading of 
economic growth and reduced disparities on a corridor level 
but not on a national level, according to Gutierrez (2001).  
While HSR “improves competitiveness and cohesion 
dimensions by shrinking the size of geographical space” by 
increasing accessibility and proximity, the biggest gains have 
still accrued to the major access points, per Vickerman (1997).   
The reduced travel time and lower transport costs 
resulting from the HSR connection may play two roles in the 
development of urban regions, according to Pol (2003): the 
effects of HSR may play “catalyzing” or “facilitating” roles, 
depending on the level of economic potential of an urban 
region. “Catalysts” draw “new activities” which lead to 
economic growth. Meanwhile, typically in “cities with a 
prosperous local economy, which need new infrastructure to 
accommodate their economic growth,” HSR acts as a 
“facilitator.” Most such cities are major metropolitan centers or 
capitals that already have “high economic potential” and are 
often “the first to be connected to the HSR-network.” Thus, the 
growth of these cities drives the demand for HSR investments 
to facilitate this growth but not create new growth.3   
Most researchers also agree that no economic growth can 
be achieved without the necessary set of conditions in place, 
such as appropriate development at the station level and 
effective public policy frameworks.  The authors also doubt 
that public infrastructure investment alone can cause 
substantial increases in new employment as potential savings 
are realized through increase in productivity of the existing 
labor force.  This also raises a “causality” question of whether 
transport investment promotes economic growth or growth 
encourages more demand for transport and thus further 
investment. 4  Nevertheless, the available literature has not yet 
provided robust results explaining the relationship between 
HSR investment and economic growth because of the 
complexity of this relationship and long period of time needed 
for the growth effects to realize, during which other factors are 
at play.  
Role of HSR in “Megalopolis” Formation 
The literature offers many characterizations and 
definitions for large agglommerations, including megacities, 
megalopolises, megaregions, megaplexes, megapolitan regions 
and others (Gottmann (1961), Pickard (1962), Ross (2009), 
and Lang and Knox (2009)). For consistency we will use the 
term megalopolis and apply the definition of such an 
“extended functional region” offered by Blum et al. (2009) as 
“a geographical area that shares a common labor market and a 
common market for household and business services.”  
The literature on the relationship between megalopolis 
and HSR has been emerging in the last several decades, as 
HSR networks have grown. Many authors agree on the 
                                                        
3 Pol, P. 2003.  
4 Banister, D. and Berechman, J. 2001. 
importance of agglomeration externalities especially those 
created by HSR investments. The role of HSR deployment in 
fusing urban areas into a single integrated economic zone 
(megalopolis) are studied by Hall (2006, 2009), Blum et al. 
(1997) and Ishii (2007).  Hall predicts that in the 21st century, 
these HSR systems would accomplish “what motorways failed 
to do: to shrink geographical space, and thus tie not only half 
of Britain, but also much of Europe, into a single polycentric 
Megalopolis”.5 Building on the many definitions of 
megalopolis and related concepts and the attempts to build 
frameworks for understanding and explaining the relationships 
between megalopolises and HSR, we now present several 
empirical cases of HSR deployment and examine their 
observed impacts on regional development. 
TOKYO-OSAKA (TOKAIDO) SHINKANSEN 
CORRIDOR 
Japan was the first country to build a high-speed rail line 
in the world.  Its first Shinkansen bullet train connecting the 
515.4 km (320 miles) distance between Tokyo and Osaka in 4 
hours was launched on October 1, 1964.  Today, the travel time 
is just under 2.5 hours, and Japan remains a world leaders in 
HSR technology with a total Shinkansen network of 2,452 km 
(1,524 miles) connecting major metropolitan areas and 
carrying over 300 million passengers per year at top speed of 
300 km/h (186 mi/h).6 Having had the longest history with 
HSR, Japan provides a valuable example of the long-term 
development impacts of HSR services on urban areas.   
Intermediate Stations and Shinkansen Frequency 
The service on Tokaido Shinkansen has maintained its 
reliability (with an average delay of 0.6 minutes) despite an 
increase in daily trains from 60 to 323.7 
There are total of 15 intermediate stations on the Tokyo-Osaka 
Shinkansen corridor.8  In 1964, the line served 12 stations 
only, three of which were newly built. All the new stations 
were built in the peripheries of the cities and were connected to 
HSR line only.  The remaining stations were existing 
conventional rail stations located in the city centers.9 
Currently, three types of trains operate on the Tokaido 
Shinkansen route with varying speeds and patterns of 
intermediate stops.  Nozomi, the fastest, operates up to up to 
300 km/h (186 mi/h) and serves only major cities, with a 
frequency of 9 trains per hour.  Hikari trains stop at some of 
the medium-sized cities, while Kodama trains serve all 15 
intermediate stations.  10 11   
                                                        
5 Hall, P. 2009, p. 808. 
6 Central Japan Railway Company. 2009. Data Book 2009.  
7United States Government Accountability Office. 2009.  
8Central Japan Railway Company Official Website. About.  
9Sands, B. 1993. 
10 Central Japan Railway Company. 2009. Data Book 2009.  
11 Central Japan Railway Company. Annual Report 2009.  
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After the Shinkansen 
The HSR corridor between Tokyo and Osaka in Japan is a 
unique case as it passes through one of the most populous 
regions in the world, with multiple urban areas of several 
million inhabitants located along the corridor.  This corridor 
attracts the highest number of riders of any high-speed rail line 
in the world (over 150 million riders annually12).  This 
explains the corridor’s financial and commercial success 
beyond the forecasts.  Tokaido Shinkansen is one of only two 
HSR routes in the world (along with the French Paris-Lyon 
TGV line) that “have broken even”.13   
Kamel et al. (2008) mentions that overall economic and 
social development impacts of Japan’s Tokaido Shinkansen 
railway are mainly the products of the travel time reductions 
between Tokyo and Osaka from 4 hours to 2 hours 25 minutes.  
The high speed is what has created “more opportunities for 
business and economic development”.14 
Evidence of Megalopolis Formation and 
Development Impacts 
The Japanese HSR  has changed the people’s lives and 
activities along the Tokaido corridor in a revolutionary way.  
Specifically, the ground-breaking speed and associated travel 
time savings have attracted significant new travel demand, 
illustrated by large annual ridership figures.  The reduction in 
travel time and high service frequencies of Tokaido 
Shinkansen have provided opportunities never offered by any 
mode before.  Figure 1 (see Annex A) presents a time-space 
diagram with the major cities along the Tokyo-Osaka corridor 
brought closer by the high-speed Shinkansen.  Relative to 
other modes, the HSR’s reach has expanded the commute zone 
to the cities that are over 200 km (124 miles) away from 
Tokyo.  The increase in “intra-organizational” business trips in 
the services sector and decrease of the overnight stays attest to 
the enlargement of the people’s daily activity zones in terms of 
physical distance, but within the acceptable temporal distance 
limits.15   
Furthermore, the “concept of formation of Extra Huge 
Economic Zones (EHEZ)” introduced by Japan’s Chubu 
Economic Federation (CEF) provides an evidence of a 
megalopolis or megaregion creation between the cities on 
Tokaido Shinkansen corridor in Japan.16  The EHEZ concept 
was developed by the CEF to make a case for implementation 
of Maglev trains on the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, which provides 
                                                        
12 Central Japan Railway Company. 2009. Data Book 2009.  
13Cited by Iñaki Barrón de Angoiti, director of high-speed rail at the International 
Union of Railways, in Victoria Burnett, “Spain’s High-Speed Rail Offers 
Guideposts for U.S.,” The New York Times On the Web, May 30, 2009. 
Retrieved in 03/25/2010 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/energy-
environment/30trains.html 
14 Kamel, K. and Matthewman, R. 2008.  
15 Shin, D. 2005. 
16 Ishii, M. 2007. 
even more dramatic reduction of the temporal distance by 
amalgamating Japan’s major urban centers together. 
Economic Development Impacts  
According to Givoni (2006), HSR creates “network effect” 
by bringing the cities closer and increasing their connectivity 
because of the travel time reductions it offers.  The “network 
effect” is in turn “the driver for the social-economic 
impacts.”17  In the transportation literature, the Shinkansen in 
Japan is often used as a model for discussing the regional 
development impacts of the HSR.  Sands (1993) concludes that 
“the Shinkansen has had strong development effects in Japan 
at the regional, urban and station levels”.18  The impacts have 
been mainly observed in the average annual population 
growth, increased employment in the “information exchange 
industries” such as “banking, real estate, education and 
political institutes”, and increase in business and tourism 
travel between the cities.   
Brotchie (1991), Amano and Nakagawa (1990) and 
Nakamura and Ueda (1989) found positive correlations 
between the proximity of a Shinkansen station and regional 
development, but could not determine the causality of this 
relationship.19 Although these empirical studies are often used 
in discussing the impacts of HSR in Japan, “the real impact of 
high-speed rail on regional-economic development is still 
difficult to assess”.20 More recently, Sasaki et al. (1997) found 
that HSR lines in Japan led “to regional dispersion of 
economic activity from developed regions to less developed 
regions to some extent,” but increasing the density of the HSR 
network did not necessarily contribute to long-term regional 
dispersion.21  Furthermore, Haynes (1997) and Sands (1993) 
argue that along the Tokyo-Osaka corridor “although growth 
parallels the high-speed train route, most of the route was 
selected on the basis of expected growth independent of the 
high-speed trains (HST)”.22  Hence, the question remains 
about the direction of causation between HSR construction and 
regional growth. 
Impacts on population growth. Overall, the cities with the 
Shinkansen railway stations along the Tokyo-Osaka corridor 
grew in population size.23  In a study by Brotchie (1991), cities 
connected to the Tokaido Shinkansen registered a 22% higher 
growth in population size than the cities with no stations but 
located along the corridor.24  These differences, on the other 
hand, may simply be a function of the smaller base size of the 
cities without stations.25  Also, the HSR aimed to connect the 
cities that already were predisposed for potential population 
                                                        
17 Givoni, M. 2006.  
18 Sands, B. 1993.  
19 Willigers, J. 2003.  
20 Willigers, J., Floor, H. and van Wee, B. 2005.  
21 Sasaki, K., Ohashi, T. and Nado, A. 1997. 
22 Haynes, K. 1997.  
23 Alabate, D. and Bel, G. 2010. 
24 Haynes, K. 1997; Sands, B. 1993. 
25 Sands, B. 1993.  
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growth due to other factors (e.g., other transportation linkages, 
demographics, physical location, etc.). 
Impacts on employment and businesses. Japan’s Tokaido 
Shinkansen HSR link has mainly “promoted the centralization 
of economic activities in big cities and favored intra-
organizational business trips”.26  Alabate et al. (2010) reviews 
a study by Plaud (1977) claiming that the service industries 
became highly concentrated in the cities of Tokyo and Osaka, 
resulting in the centralization of this sector in the country’s 
major cities.  This trend can be supported by the fall in 
employment in Nagoya following the inauguration of the HST 
line, “estimated at around 30% down from 1955 to 1970”. 
During the same period, Osaka and Kyoto registered an 
employment increase of 35%27 And Osaka became a new 
regional center of growth with the expansion of the 
Shinkansen network to other corridors.  In the retail industry, 
Tokyo has gained the most benefits.  Also, since “intra-
organizational journeys” have become easier, business travel 
has increased significantly; however, the number of business 
overnight stays in hotels in Tokyo and Osaka has decreased.28 
Regions with good accessibility to the Shinkansen stations 
also have registered higher growth in employment relative to 
regions with no direct HSR connection.  This trend is 
observable mainly in the locations like Tokyo and Osaka 
dominated by "information exchange industries" (business 
services, banking services, real estate), and with higher 
education institutes, which registered the highest increase of 
employees.  And on the contrary, presence of large number of 
manufacturing industries in Nagoya has limited its regional 
growth even with presence of the HSR station.  In addition, 
“the combination of expressway and the Shinkansen” had a 
stronger effect on growth rates”.29   
In cities with HSR stations “employment growth in retail, 
industrial, construction and wholesaling was 16–34% higher” 
than in those without.  Amano and Nakagawa (1990) found 
independently that growth in employment was 26% greater in 
cities with Shinkansen stations than that in cities with no 
stations (“1.8% to 1.3% respectively”30) . According to 
Brotchie (1991), “food and accommodation sectors” grew 
significantly at “both intermediate and termination stations”. 31 
32  However, this growth in the cities may be a result of 
“displacement of activity from elsewhere and should not be 
interpreted as being indicative of net growth”.33 
Impacts on near station development. The Shinkansen 
stations that were newly built in 1964 became city centers with 
transit terminals, hotels, offices, retail, dining and cultural 
                                                        
26Alabate, D. and Bel, G. 2010.  
27Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Sands, B. 1993.  
30 Haynes, K. 1997.  
31 Ibid 
32 Sands, B. 1993.  
33 Ibid 
facilities, and parking, and had on average greater effects on 
the “redevelopment of surrounding areas” than the expanded 
existing stations at the time. 34  At first, the development 
around Shin-Osaka station in Osaka was low because it was 
separated from the city by a river, but eventually, the 
development was stimulated by initiation of “large-scale 
development projects”, and opening of additional 
“transportation linkages” between the station and the city 
center.35 
In Yokohama, in addition to being a part of residential 
urban sprawl of the metropolitan Tokyo area, the area around 
the Shin-Yokohama station had a major inflow of mid-size 
companies, mainly in the computer software sector.  Heavy 
development of the area around the entrance of the station led 
to the formation of a new city center in Yokohama. 
Impacts on Tourism. Tourism has also showed significant 
growth following opening of the Shinkansen: rising from 15 to 
25% between 1964 and 1975.  However, this increase has had 
mixed effects across the cities on the corridor.  The overnight 
stays decreases due to shorter travel times by HSR affected 
more the intermediate stops rather than the terminal points.36  
The six prefectures of Tokyo experienced the largest increase 
in the number of tourists.37 
PARIS-LYON TGV SUD-EST CORRIDOR 
France was the second country to initiate the development 
of a HSR system following Japan and the first in Europe. Its 
first Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV) high-speed train 
connecting Paris and Lyon (425 km) in 2 hours was fist 
launched in 1981. Since then, France has been gradually 
developing its TGV network and has become one of the leaders 
in HSR technology. Today, France has 1,896 km (1,178 miles) 
of dedicated TGV lines connecting major cities to Paris and 
carrying 128 million passengers per year (in 2008)38 at top 
speed of 320 km/h (199 mi/h).39   
After the TGV 
Several empirical studies have been done to assess the 
impacts of the TGV line on the regional and economic 
development of Paris and Lyon, with emphasis on business 
location and development, and tourism.  Overall, the line 
connecting the two strongest economic regions in France, was 
fully successful technically, commercially and financially, 
generating traffic demand and net revenues beyond the 
estimated forecasts.  The line has paid off its construction costs 
within 11 years and still remains profitable for SNCF.40   
                                                        
34 Shin, D. 2005. 
35 Sands, B. 1993.  
36 Haynes, K. 1997.  
37 ARUP – TMG. 2001.  
38 Le Journal du Net. Retrieved on 05/11/2010. 
39 International Union of Railways (UIC) High Speed Department. 2009.  
40 Midwest High Speed Rail Association. 2009.  
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Evidence of Megalopolis Formation and 
Development Impacts 
In the 30 years since its implementation, the HSR Sud-Est 
link has gradually brought the two largest urban centers in 
France closer by reducing the “temporal distances” between 
them (see Figure 2). The distance is no longer quoted in 
kilometers but in hours and minutes, with Lyon being “2 hours 
away from Paris.”  Roth (1990) discusses that the perception of 
transportation users has evolved and “travel time or ‘temporal 
distances’ matter more than the distance traveled,” creating “a 
certain psychological impression of the weight of the trip 
made.”  He asserts that “the TGV modifies the spatio-temporal 
relationships between cities... and as a consequence influences 
the behavior of potential and actual users”, which in turn 
eventually leads to changes in the “social and economic 
relationships between” these cities.41 The author also observes 
that the “psychological weight of a trip” is determined not only 
by the “temporal distances” but also the quality of the service 
such as frequency, “comfort”, “ease of access”, and other 
factors that “ease” the trip.42 
One of the fundamental impacts of the Paris-Lyon HSR on 
the users’ behavior is the significant levels of induced traffic it 
generated, attesting mainly to the increase in business trips 
made related to the buying/selling of services. Total business 
travel on the corridor increased 56%, and those made for 
sale/purchase of services by 112%.43  Table 1 (see Annex B) 
shows the growth of business travel by mode originating in 
Paris and Lyon between 1980 and 1985.  Round trips 
originating in Paris have increased much less than round trips 
originating in Lyons.  In addition, surveys44 showed that the 
number of overnight stays by TGV passengers fell after the 
introduction of HSR from 74 to 46% (between 1981 and 1985).   
Thus, the reduced “temporal distance” between Paris and 
Lyons due to HSR link has led to changes in the mobility 
patterns of users, and generated new travel with a high number 
of one-day roundtrips.  These factors provide an evidence of a 
formation of a megalopolis or megaregion between cities of 
Lyon and Paris. However, despite the connection to the TGV, 
the intermediate cities, Le Creusot and Macon, have not 
experienced the same levels of interaction with Paris or Lyon.  
This can be explained by the very low frequencies of HSR 
services provided in these cities (8 vs. 30 trains/day in Paris).   
Economic Development Impacts 
Most benefits of the HSR service supply between Paris and 
Lyon have been absorbed by the Paris region, “mainly due to 
the spatial concentration of population”.  Some positive effects 
from the HSR connection are also observed in Lyon, mainly 
                                                        
41 Roth, D. 1990. 
42 Ibid 
43 Pieda (Planning, Economic and Development Consultants). 1991. 
44 Bonnafous, A. 1987.  
“in the form of an increase in economic cooperation and 
exchanges with Paris”.45  
An empirical study undertaken by Bonnafous (1987) 
discusses the regional impact of the TGV HSR between Paris 
and Lyon based on the surveys conducted before and after HSR 
inauguration with an emphasis on the tourism and services 
industries.  Before TGV deployment, TGV created fears among 
the service enterprises in the Rhone-Alps province (around 
Lyon) that their Parisian competitors would expand and 
displace them.  However, in reality the opposite occurred: the 
Lyon region companies were able to access and expand to the 
Parisian market mainly in the areas of market research, 
advertising, and consulting, thus benefiting from the TGV 
connection. The fears that Lyon might lose its company 
headquarters to Paris also did not materialize: specialized 
enterprises, whose markets are outside the regional boundaries 
or are international, no longer needed to relocate to Paris as it 
became easily accessible with TGV.  So, there is an emerging 
trend to look for clients in Paris but carry out work in the 
province with a distinct quality of life.  The survey showed that 
Parisians increased their business journeys to the Rhone-Alps 
province by 52% for service trade, while the residents of 
Rhone-Alps increased their trips to Paris by 144% for the same 
purposes.46 It should be noted that these surveys were 
conducted two-three years after the inauguration of Paris-Lyon 
TGV line, and the effects may have evolved further by now.  
In case of Macon, some development occurred, which was 
partially spurred by the HSR connection.  Macon registered a 
13.5% increase in employment between 1999 and 2006, 
compared to surrounding cities which have actually lost jobs. 
This growth can be attributed to the availability of high speed 
linkages resulting in proximity to the large neighboring 
economic centers of Paris and Lyon. The decrease in 
employment in the adjacent cities attests that the relocation of 
some businesses took place within the province to near the 
HSR station in Macon. Macon has always been one of the 
Saône-et-Loire department’s major employment areas and 
attractive for the regional companies, and the HSR link helped 
to reinforce Macon’s already attractive location.  On the 
negative side, the growth in Macon appears to have occurred at 
the expense of the neighboring cities from where the 
companies relocated.  
The development impacts on the former coal producing 
town of Le Creusot were not as expected.  The town hoped to 
attract a large pool of companies by its new HSR station and 
85 minute time distance to Paris; however, six years after the 
opening only two companies were situated around the TGV-
station.47  Also, a new TGV station “had almost no local 
economic impact in terms of new jobs, firms or commercial 
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expansion. This was due in part to its isolated station, poor 
road access and historical image”.48  
The opening of HSR connection in Lyon helped to attract 
companies from cities not connected to the TGV HSR network 
such as Grenoble and Genève.  A number of high-tech 
companies originating from Paris also opened their “back-
offices” in Lyon.  The companies concentrated mostly close to 
Lyon’s TGV station Gare Part Dieu, which has developed into 
one of the most important business parks of France.   The 
amount of its office space has increased by 43% between 1983 
and 1990.  Due to the local authorities’ efforts to promote Part-
Dieu station development, the area around this TGV station 
has become “the most sought-after location for office space in 
Lyon” with “almost 40 percent of the city’s total office space”, 
and planned for more. Between 1983 and 1990, the office 
space around the station increased 43%.49   
However, it should be noted that “these measures may 
reflect displacement of activity from elsewhere and should not 
be interpreted as being indicative of net growth.50 The 
development of businesses around HSR station in Lyon has 
happened at the cost of a lower development in the city’s 
traditional downtown, which became deserted by companies 
relocating to near the TGV station. Other negative effects are 
the experiences by the cities without HSR such as Grenoble 
and Geneve, who lost their businesses to Lyon.   
While the business growth in Lyon can be attributed 
mainly to the introduction of the HSR link, many argue that 
Lyon’s location was already attractive before the TGV started 
operations, and the TGV was only part of the decision process 
for businesses to locate themselves at the city’s station area. 
Sands (1993) and Haynes (1997) conclude that the TGV plays 
a minor role in location decisions of most firms.  In a survey of 
businesses near the Lyon’s Part-Dieu Station, only 33% 
responded that HSR was one of the factors in their location.51  
These companies have indicated that “the HSR station was an 
important factor, but not the decisive one for setting-up offices 
in Lyon.  Plans did already exist and the TGV subsequently 
acted as an incentive”.52  Other factors include market 
proximity, accessibility to the rest of the transport network 
(road and rail links), and public assistance. 
Lyon also experienced a strong growth in tourism business 
after the introduction of HSR, which has had a major impact 
on the city’s economy, but the effects were two-fold.  On one 
hand, while business trips increased, the TGV allowed making 
these trips in a day, thus reducing the number of overnight 
stays to the detriment of hotel businesses (length of stay 
decreased from 2.3 days in 1980 to 1.7 days in 1992).  On the 
other hand, the overall number of visitors for conferences has 
increased, forcing the restructuring of the hospitality 
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businesses to adapt to new groups of customers.  The HSR 
along with the hospitality infrastructure development and 
Lyon’s “aggressive promotion and communication strategy” 
have put Lyon “on the tourist map and increased tourist 
awareness of the city.”53  
COLOGNE (KÖLN) -FRANKFURT ICE CORRIDOR 
Germany started developing its HSR network shortly after 
France.  Its first two Inter-City Express (ICE) high-speed lines 
were inaugurated in 1991, with upgraded links between 
Hannover and Würzburg and between Mannheim and 
Stuttgart.  In 2002, Germany opened its first newly built 
passenger dedicated ICE line serving the 177 km (110 miles) 
distance between the cities of Cologne (Köln) and Frankfurt 
am Main.  With trains running at a speed of 320 km/h (199 
mi/h), this new ICE has reduced the rail journey times from 
2hr 15min to just over an hour for non-stop service.54 Today, 
Germany has an established network of 1,285 km (798 miles) 
of ICE lines, serving the major German cities as well as 
destinations in neighboring countries at top speed of 330 km/h 
(205 mi/h).   
After ICE  
The new ICE line effectively links two of Germany's most 
active economic regions, the Rhine-Main area (population 3 
million) and the Rhine-Ruhr region (population 10 million).  
Direct economic and socio-economic impacts are evaluated 
regularly such as impacts on pollution, congestion, 
environment, etc., however, there seem to be no official studies 
assessing the indirect impacts of this particular corridor such 
as on regional development, labor markets, etc. 
“The city pair Cologne-Frankfurt seems to be a perfect 
example of the benefits from a shift from short distance air 
services to high-speed railway.”55  This ICE route not only 
supports air travel as a feeder to long distance flights, but also 
has raised the competitiveness of rail against short haul flights 
and cars.  The ridership on the Cologne-Frankfurt line has 
been growing, and the DB expects passenger numbers to more 
than double by 2010 to around 20–25 million from current 9 
million.  Limburg accounts for about 2,500 people using its 
ICE station daily, and between 2003 and 2005 this number 
grew by 32% and is expected to grow further.  In Siegburg, 
since the commissioning of the station, the number of 
passengers has also been increasing steadily.  
Evidence of Megalopolis Formation and 
Development Impacts 
According to Blum et al. (1997), the HSR link serves two 
purposes: to “potentially substitute for an air connection 
between two major cities (or rather central business districts - 
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CBDs) at long distance with a direct train connection”; or to 
link “together many cities and CBD’s, hence, creating a new 
type of region with a high intra-regional accessibility”.  In the 
latter case, the HSR “binds together cities in a band, where 
each pair of cities is at a time distance of between 20 and 40 
min, i.e. a time distance that allows daily commuting.” Blum 
and Haynes (1997) argue that such a connection “gives rise to 
a band of cities and, hence, creates an extended functional 
region formed like a string of pearls”.  Germany is an example 
where “a number of cities are connected in exactly this manner 
by a high-speed train”.  “In the German case we could speak 
not only of bands of cities but rather of a network of cities 
connected by high-speed trains.”56 
The cities of Montabaur and Limburg are located exactly 
between two major agglomerations – the Rhine-Main area and 
the Rhine-Ruhr conurbations – and have become more 
reachable to the traditional employment center-cities in these 
conurbations such as Cologne, Frankfurt, and Wiesbaden 
(another large city in the state of Hesse) since the deployment 
of the connection to the ICE high speed services.  The ICE line 
has moved the cities closer in space-time thus integrating them 
into a large megaregion or megalopolis. Frankfurt has been a 
large commuting destination for work and business trips by 
road and conventional railway modes but from much closer 
distances given the lower speeds of these modes. With the 
high-speed service, within the same travel time of up to one 
hour, the vicinity of reach has been expanded and now 
Montabaur, Limburg and Siegburg are within an acceptable 
time-space “zone” of reach to Frankfurt.  Figure 3 (see Annex 
A) demonstrates time-space chart for the ICE trains and other 
modes for travel from the cities on the corridor to Frankfurt. 
Economic Development Impacts 
Montabaur and Limburg have always been the central 
points of commuter trips from the Westerwald and the Limburg 
regions. Despite their proximity to large metropolitan areas, 
the regions around Montabaur and Limburg have preserved a 
rural character, with a high quality of living and affordable 
land prices and rents that make them attractive for migration 
inflow.57 The ICE connection has reinforced and accelerated 
this migration process and showed its effect already a few 
months after the opening of the stations.  This statement can 
be supported by the results of the survey of commuters in 
Montabaur and Limburg carried out by Nina Demuth (2004) 
with the support of the Westerwaldkreis mbH Economic 
Development Corporation in 2004.58 The survey infers that the 
ICE train stations in Limburg and Montabaur are used 
primarily by commuters to travel daily to work places in 
Frankfurt, and that “the attractiveness of the ICE has triggered 
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the increase in urbanization development around the ICE 
stations.”   
Frankfurt as a major employment market, and, therefore, 
is an important hub for commuters from Montabaur, Limburg, 
and surrounding area. Being one of the largest job centers 
throughout Germany, Frankfurt attracts 80% of daily 
commuters on the ICE line from Limburg and about 60% of 
commuters from Montabaur59 .  This can be explained by the 
fact that the ICE services have higher frequency and better 
connectivity options offered in direction of Frankfurt from the 
Montabaur and Limburg ICE stations, especially during rush 
hours.  
The increase in the commuting patterns from these small 
towns may be a result of the inflow of new residents stimulated 
by the availability of a high speed access to the large centers.  
About 20% of the Montabaur ICE commuters and about 15% 
of the Limburg ICE commuters responded to the survey saying 
that they moved to these towns from the neighboring large 
metropolitan areas such as Rhine-Ruhr conurbations and 
Cologne/Bonn because of the ICE and the improved speed and 
accessibility it offers. 
Experts in the city planning and housing industries  
believe that the ICE connection in Montabaur “acts as an 
amplifier of a trend” that has already started, i.e. people 
relocating from the core of the metropolitan areas out to 
Montabaur city and adjacent residential areas seeking higher 
quality and lower land costs.60  The main factors in residential 
choice, per the experts, are distance to the ICE station by road, 
rent and home costs.   
In terms of development effects due to high-speed line 
connection, Montabaur and Limburg have been affected 
positively.  The population gains, triggered by the ICE railway 
station, are considered very important for the region’s future 
development.  The induced migration is expected to offset the 
expected loss of population caused by the demographic 
changes such as decline in natural population growth, and 
stabilize the population size of Montabaur region and the 
Westerwald district.61  In the case of Limburg, however, the 
extent of urbanization development has been moderate.  After 
ICE station inauguration, the municipalities in Limburg region 
have imposed some restrictive settlement policies to prevent 
from turning the area into pure "residential bedroom 
communities." 
The history of the ICE train stations is still young; 
therefore, an economic boom in the cities is not yet observable, 
except that another “residential suburbanization”62 is emerging 
from the nearby metropolitan areas that are now spreading to 
the regions Montabaur and Limburg as a result of improved 
accessibility.  By becoming part of high quality ICE network, 
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the cities gained new opportunities, which can be used for their 
development.  
Concerning the impacts of the ICE on Siegburg, 
investigations of the Geographical Institute of Bonn University 
have shown that 90% of passengers travel to and from 
Frankfurt, and about three quarters of the passengers use the 
train for business or commuting.63  The economic development 
of the Rheine-Sieg region is linked to the increases in real 
estate investments that are in turn triggered in part by the new 
ICE connection.  Studies at the University of Bonn showed that 
almost 3% of the ICE-users from Siegburg have chosen to 
reside in this town because of the ICE connection.   
CROSS-CASE COMPARISON: APPLICATION TO 
PORTUGAL AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Before the deployment of HSR lines, all the studied 
corridors were served by three modes of transport – air, 
conventional rail and road – and connected two major 
metropolitan areas at two ends of the line.  In Tokyo-Osaka 
and Paris-Lyon, air was emerging as the biggest competitor to 
rail, offering the fastest travel times.  But in the German case 
the biggest competitor appears to be road (57% traffic was 
carried by road before HSR).  All the corridors, except 
Cologne-Frankfurt, pass through the most densely populated 
regions of the respective countries and include capital cities, 
and the pre-HSR service in all corridors faced (or are facing) 
capacity constraints.   
Emergence of Megalopolises 
Among the expected impacts of high-speed rail investment 
are changes in accessibility through travel time cuts and 
increases in mobility options. Gutierrez (2001) defines the 
“daily accessibility indicator” as the number of possible 
business contacts (for business trips) and the market potential 
(for tourist trips).  It “measures how much population can be 
reached from a place (or can reach a place) in a certain travel 
time limit and the changes in accessible population brought 
about by a new infrastructure.”64  Since HSR allows reaching 
more population and more places at a reduced travel time 
relative to other modes of transportation, we can say that it 
contributes to the increase of the “daily accessibility indicator.” 
This in turn expands the area of reach and thus access to new 
and greater markets located within a shorter temporal distance 
than before (Figure 4 lays out this chain of HSR impacts 
through megalopolis formation). 
However, there is no straight-forward way for determining 
when a megalopolis is indeed formed as a result of HSR 
deployment, leading to a question of how one would know that 
a megalopolis emerges. There is no precise process for 
measuring and identifying the emergence of megalopolis, 
however, there are certain parameters that could guide us to 
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conclude that megalopolis is formed. Some of these parameters 
observed in the travel patterns between the cities connected by 
a HSR line include:  
 
 significant increases in one-day round trips between a pair 
or group of cities,  
 high levels of newly generated induced demand overall,  
 induced demand for business trips,  
 increase in the number of daily commuters, 
 decrease in overnight hotel stays.  
It is important to note that these parameters may be affected by 
factors other than the HSR infrastructure, making the causal 
relationship difficult to verify. 
Further, HSR by changing the relative accessibility and 
effectively creating “a different social and economic space” 65 
through the megalopolis/megaregion formation contributes to 
economic development.  A larger labor market also justifies 
and facilitates specialization of workers and jobs thus 
increasing productivity and contributing to economic growth.66  
However, the spatial distribution of this growth may not be 
equitable or uniform. “A better connection between two 
regions not only gives firms in a less developed region better 
access to the inputs and markets of more developed regions,” 
but also can harm them by reallocating economic activity to 
the richer regions.67  Thus, development in one place may 
occur at the expense of another place, and there may be those 
who will lose and those who will win from HSR.  HSR may 
also contribute to economic shifts through relocation of 
economic activity from one region to another rather than 
economic growth, leading to zero sum growth (no growth) or 
modest economic development (Figure 4).  For example, if a 
country experiences positive growth, but individually a city not 
connected to HSR experiences negative growth due to loss of 
economic activity to the cities  with HSR stations, modest 
development occurs but through economic shifts.  There could 
also be absolute growth observed within the cities that lose 
economic activity, while relative growth may be negative.   
In the case studies for Japan, France and Germany, the 
implemented HSR routes have changed the relative 
accessibility and economic space of the urban areas linked to 
the HSR corridors. The time-space diagrams for each corridor 
shown in Annex A illustrate this impact by cities becoming 
closer to each other and fusing into a megalopolis.  Based on 
the case studies, the emergence of the megalopolis appears in 
two different ways:  (1) as a megalopolis formed between one 
(or both) of the large cities and several small intermediate 
cities along the HSR corridor (as observed in the German and 
Japanese cases); and (2) as a megalopolis formed between the 
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two large cities connected at two ends by a high-speed train, 
while the smaller intermediate urban areas are excluded 
(similar to the French Paris-Lyon connection).  Both of these 
megalopolis forms could potentially emerge simultaneously, 
creating a “hybrid megalopolis,” although this has not been 
observed in our case studies.  
Below we summarize and sketch megalopolis formations 
drawing from the case studies.  The cities that have gained the 
most benefits and those that have become worse off as a result 
of the HSR are also listed (Figures 5, 6 and 7 in Annex A).  
The accompanying tables in Figures  provide detailed 
information on the main HSR stations such as service 
frequency, compatibility with conventional rail, direct link to 
an airport and the industry focus of the station cities.  Each of 
these megalopolises has different magnitudes of impacts on the 
urban areas located along the corridor.   
Japan’s Tokyo-Osaka corridor. The HSR link in the 
Tokyo-Osaka corridor has favored the most those cities that 
specialize predominantly in “information exchange industries” 
(such as banking services, real estate, R&D, education, and/or 
political institutes).  These cities are Tokyo and Osaka mainly, 
where employment levels have substantially increased since 
the HSR deployment.  Interaction increased between the cities 
with the services industry and tourism focus, driven primarily 
by growth in business and tourism travel from nearby cities.  
The HSR link also contributed to further centralization of 
economic activity in the major metropolitan areas of Tokyo and 
Osaka.  Nagoya, with a prevailing manufacturing industry 
base, experienced losses in employment levels as HSR plays a 
minimal role in the manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
While positive regional developments such as employment 
growth occurred in the urban areas along the corridor, the 
causal relationship with HSR is not clear, and it is possible that 
new growth came at the expense of other regions outside of the 
Shinkansen network.  One-day trips have increased and 
overnight stays decreased mainly to/from the intermediate 
stops rather than between the terminus points, thus leading to 
a conclusion that two daily activity zones or megalopolises 
were formed between the cities at two ends of the route, but not 
between Tokyo and Osaka (see Figure 5 in Annex A).  
France’s Paris-Lyon Corridor. The TGV further 
reinforced the existing centralization of economic activity in 
Paris primarily.  Paris was the biggest winner from the HSR 
connection to Lyon, allowing some of the Paris-based 
companies to increase services exchanged in the Lyon markets. 
Lyon also benefited substantially by attracting a large pool of 
businesses, mostly relocated from neighboring cities and 
within the Rhone-Alps region, a high number of business 
tourists, and access to Parisian services market.  Macon has 
experienced a small growth of businesses and increase in 
employment, but it was mainly due to business relocations 
within the Saône-et-Loire department and not from Paris or 
Lyon. Le Creusot gained neither jobs or commercial growth 
following the opening of the connection .  The significantly 
high levels of new trips generated by TGV have contributed to 
the economic development of the connected regions; however, 
it was mainly a result of redistribution of economic activity 
from cities with no HSR to the cities with HSR station.  The 
increase in the one-day tourism trips and decrease in 
overnight stays as well as the growth in intra-organizational 
business trips between Paris and Lyon attest to the fusion of 
these two cities into one daily activity zone, i.e. megalopolis 
(see Figure 6 in Annex A).    
Germany’s Cologne-Frankfurt Corridor. The findings 
and evidence from the existing studies lead us to conclude that 
smaller cities Montabaur and Limburg, previously not 
connected to conventional rail, were affected positively as a 
result of improved proximity to the major centers of Frankfurt 
and Cologne. Daily commuting trips from Montabaur and 
Limburg to Frankfurt have increased since the ICE line 
opening, thus bringing these cities closer and integrating them 
into a megalopolis. This increase is due to increased 
residential inflow to Montabaur and Limburg, which has been 
attracted partly by the new ICE access.  There is no evidence of 
a megaregion formed between Siegburg and Cologne as the 
traffic increase originating in Siegburg is not significant and 
the trips are mostly taken in direction of Frankfurt, and not as 
much to Cologne.  Frankfurt has benefited more than Cologne 
by attracting more commuters, which can be explained by its 
much larger labor market compared to Cologne’s.  However, 
residences relocating from Frankfurt to Montabaur and 
Limburg count not as new employment and growth but rather 
as reallocated economic activity. There is no evidence found 
supporting the formation of a megalopolis between Frankfurt 
and Cologne.  The increase in travel on this O-D pair 
comprises mostly those traveling to Frankfurt airport, and not 
to the city center. This may be explained by the limited 
business interactions between the two cities, given the 
differences in their dominating economic activities: Cologne is 
a cultural center while Frankfurt is a center of finance and 
banking (see Figure 7 in Annex A).   
Role of Induced Demand  
Drawing from the experiences of Japan, France and 
Germany, on the national level HSR may play a catalyst role 
resulting in new growth, or a redistributive role resulting in 
relocation of economic activity within the corridor, which 
amounts to zero-sum growth.68  The HSR-linked areas become 
more attractive relative to the unconnected areas leading to 
relocation of residents and businesses. If the induced traffic is 
driven from within the relocated population or businesses, the 
growth it leads to would be at the expense of cities that lost its 
population, i.e. relocated (or redistributed) growth.  Both the 
Paris-Lyon and Cologne-Frankfurt HSR corridors generated 
induced demand of about 50%; however, some of it has been a 
                                                        
68 Pol, P. M. J. 2003.  
 11 Copyright © 2011 by ASME 
result of an inflow of businesses and residents relocating from 
other parts of the country to the more attractive cities with 
HSR stations.  Thus, on the national level the economic growth 
was redistributed, at least in part.   
Theoretically, net growth may happen when high-speed 
line induces substantial levels of new travel demand, i.e. 
changing the travel patterns of people who otherwise would 
not have traveled the longer physical distances, but will 
because of the improved accessibility, mobility and lower 
travel time offered by HSR.  Computing this net growth is 
difficult as there are a number of other factors that may have 
greater impacts on growth than HSR.  The new traffic induced 
from within the city (excluding those who relocated to the city 
from other areas) creates new demand for services and hence 
contributes to the development of new businesses to 
accommodate this new demand.  The development of new 
businesses creates new employment opportunities, which in 
turn contributes to creation of more new traffic. 
Potential for Megalopolis Formation along Portugal’s 
Lisbon-Porto Corridor 
Portugal intends to deploy HSR on the 297 km (185 miles) 
Lisbon-Porto corridor in 2015 (although likely postponed in 
light of the financial crisis), eventually offering non-stop travel 
between the two cities of 1 hour 15 minutes, while also serving 
the four smaller intermediate cities of Oeste, Leiria, Coimbra, 
and Aveiro. Below we focus on analyzing the potential of 
megalopolis formation on the planned HSR corridor between 
Lisbon and Porto, the country’s two biggest cities.  
Lisbon-Porto corridor already has well-developed 
conventional rail connections.  It is currently served by two 
types of rail services: Alfa Pendular, an upgraded to high-speed 
conventional line (2 hours 45 minutes) and conventional 
service (3 hours 15 minutes).  Alfa Pendular’s service 
frequency from Lisbon and from Porto is 11 trains per day, 
with only 2 making all intermediate stops.69 This existing rail 
network uses non-standard 1,668 mm gauge tracks, while the 
new high-speed lines are planned to be built to the 
international standard 1,435 mm gauge to ensure high speeds 
and compatibility with the EU HSR network.  
The temporal distances between the cities planned to be 
connected by the new Lisbon-Porto HSR line will be reduced 
significantly relative to travel times by any currently available 
mode of transportation. The high speed link would shrink the 
entire 297 km (185 miles) corridor within the limits of 90-
minute travel time, making it a zone of one-day activity and 
potentially forming a megalopolis.  Figure 8 visualizes the 
time-space distances by mode from Lisbon.  
A megalopolis may emerge along the corridor as a result 
of increased interaction between the cities in two different 
ways as was observed in the case studies discussed earlier.  
Applying the same logic, we offer the three possibilities of 
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potential megalopolis formations along the future Lisbon-Porto 
HSR corridor: (1) megalopolis forming between two main end 
cities (Lisbon- Porto); (2) megalopolis forming at one of either 
ends of the HSR routes or both simultaneously (Lisbon-Oeste-
Leiria and Porto-Aveiro-Coimbra); and (3) emergence of 
combinations of both cases in (1) and (2) simultaneously 
creating a “hybrid megalopolis” (see sketches of various 
combinations in Figure 9 of Annex A). A fourth possibility is 
for no megalopolis to form. Since the Lisbon-Porto corridor 
already has well-developed rail services, the incremental 
impacts from increased speed on most of the cities may be very 
small. With no induced traffic or no changes in the travel 
patterns, no increase in the interaction between the cities may 
take place, and thus no fusion of multiple cities and formation 
of a megalopolis may happen. Of course, the absence of 
megalopolis does not imply the absence of economic 
development. Growth may still occur, just without major 
changes in the spatial structure of cities and interaction 
between them (e.g., Montabaur and Limburg in Germany). 
Regional Development Effects on Urban Areas 
For the cities connected to HSR line, accessibility 
increases, and with even greater magnitude for smaller cities 
than for large cities, as the latter already have good 
accessibility levels.  The question, however, is not whether 
accessibility improves for small cities, but rather, what does 
that accessibility mean for the economic activity, labor 
markets, and distribution of growth.   
The three case studies confirm the theory of Pol (2003) 
that “new forms of infrastructure” such as HSR “tend to be 
constructed where there is already much interaction” and “the 
most intensive interaction occurs among economic key areas”, 
usually capital cities.70  In all three cases, the decisions to 
construct the high-speed lines were made mainly to solve 
limited capacity issues on the existing corridors with high 
demand for accessibility, and in two cases (Japan and France) 
capital cities were the first to be connected, while smaller 
urban areas were connected as intermediate stops in part due to 
political pressures.  Germany’s internal geopolitics such as re-
unification between East and West Germany with different 
capitals and the historical presence of several major urban 
economies led to a more dispersed network of HSR lines.   
In all three cases, the cities with already “strong 
competitive positions”71 and consequently stronger economic 
potential have benefited more than smaller urban regions did.  
This is also in line with Pol’s theory that HSR’s “influence on 
urban areas” depends on the pre-existent “economic potential 
of an urban region”.  The same theory expects HSR will have a 
“catalytic” effect on cities with lower economic growth, and a 
“facilitating” effect on already economically prosperous cities.  
However, based on the case studies, the “catalyzing effect” 
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(i.e., development of new activities in an urban area) leads to 
net economic growth on a city level, but on a national level 
this growth usually occurs at the expense of other urban areas.  
Hence, the HSR may have a third type of effect on the national 
economy – a redistributive effect. 
Minimizing Negative Effects of HSR on Small Urban 
Areas 
Cities not connected to the HSR will be the worst off by 
potentially losing their businesses, labor market and 
population to the cities with HSR stations.  The impacts of 
HSR on smaller cities located at intermediate stops may vary, 
with some benefiting, some losing, and some remaining the 
same. Based on the case studies discussed in this paper, the 
following factors and strategies for HSR deployment can lead 
to a higher likelihood of benefits for small urban areas not 
connected to the network. 
Compatibility with conventional rail system. 
Compatibility of the TGV with the conventional rail system 
has allowed a greater area of reach of TGV trains to the remote 
areas without the need to invest in high-speed track extensions. 
For example, TGV trains may reach some remote areas in 
France without traveling through Paris.   Given the differences 
with the gauge size of conventional track , Japan’s Shinkansen 
was integrated with the conventional rail through allowing 
stations to be shared by both high-speed and traditional trains. 
This structure ensures provision of feeder services to HSR 
stations from cities not connected to HSR, and the track does 
not have to be compatible.  Portugal plans to integrate the 
Lisbon-Porto HSR line with the existing conventional rail 
network by designing the stations to accommodate both high-
speed and conventional trains, specifically the stations in 
Lisbon, Leiria, Coimbra, and Porto, so that easy connection 
and transfer between two types of services is allowed. In 
addition, flexible-gauge vehicles will be purchased which can 
take advantage of changeovers, which are planned for 
installation near stations in Aveiro, Coimbra, Porto and 
Lisbon, to allow the circulation of high-speed and conventional 
trains in both networks.  If Portugal implements these 
measures, the potential negative effects on the small urban 
areas may be minimized. The integration of HSR with the 
conventional network would also generate greater passenger 
traffic through a network effect.  
Frequent stops at intermediate stations. The increased 
frequency of stops of HSR service at intermediate stations 
would contribute to regional development and reduction of 
regional disparities by more equally distributing the benefits of 
HSR to the smaller urban areas located in between the major 
centers.  However, increasing frequency will lead to lower 
average speeds, and consequently lower capacity and longer 
travel times.  This in turn may make HSR less competitive 
with other modes, especially with air, resulting in little change 
in accessibility and mobility, limited generation of new traffic, 
especially for business purposes, and consequently suppress the 
overall development benefits that high-speed rail may yield.  
Therefore, frequency is an important factor for achieving 
economic development impacts and for ensuring the more 
equitable distribution of these impacts to smaller urban areas. 
The trade-off has to be made to balance these two goals.  
Adequate access to other modal connections. Integrating 
HSR with  other modal services is an important factor in 
improving regional access and maximizing accessibility 
changes driven by HSR lines: these include, for example, 
direct linkages with urban transit systems and airports in 
major cities. 
According to Vickerman (1997), HSR is considered an 
“intermediate level” mode as it serves inter-city trips, and its 
impacts depend on how well it is connected to local “lower 
level” (e.g., parking, road, transit, other local transportation, 
etc.) and to international “higher level” (e.g., international 
airports) networks.  Therefore, provision of adequate access 
from HSR nodes to other modal networks is critical. No matter 
how fast the HSR network is, “for firms and individuals in the 
region, the critical factor will be how easy it is to access that 
network”,72 especially, in case of peripheral station locations. 
Similar to conventional rail feeder services, other modes may 
extend the HSR’s service area to cities not connected to HSR 
without the need to build high-speed track extensions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As concerns for climate change grow and demands for fast 
and sustainable transport alternatives increase, high-speed rail 
networks will continue to expand worldwide.  This will call for 
a need to better understand the role HSR may play in changing 
people’s travel patterns and forming new economic 
geographies of cities – megalopolises or megaregions – and 
how economic development effects of HSR may be distributed 
within these new geographies.   
A rich literature exists on HSR and there is a general 
consensus among researchers about the possible range of 
development impacts of HSR investment, including impacts on 
spatial location of economic activity, accessibility and 
proximity to economic mass, labor markets, and productivity.  
However, the question of the causality between HSR 
investment and economic growth still remains because of the 
complexity of this relationship and long period of time needed 
for the growth effects to realize, during which other factors are 
at play. Below, we present our main conclusions drawn from 
the case studies with respect to potential for megalopolis 
formation and development implications of HSR:   
HSR investment is associated with potential changes in 
accessibility and market size, as a result of reduction in 
travel time and transportation costs, which in turn may lead 
to economic and functional integration of multiple urban 
areas by fusing them into a megalopolis.  The emergence of a 
                                                        
72 Vickerman, R. 1997.  
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megalopolis or multiple megalopolises may occur in different 
forms as a result of accessibility and proximity to larger 
markets brought about by HSR.  For example, in both Tokyo-
Osaka Shinkansen and Cologne-Frankfurt ICE corridor case 
studies, a megalopolis formation is observed between one (or 
both) of the large cities at the two ends of the corridor and 
several small intermediate cities in between.  In the case of 
Paris-Lyon TGV line in France, a megalopolis has emerged 
between Paris and Lyon connected at two ends of the route, 
while the smaller urban areas in between have not been 
integrated.  The emergence of all these megalopolis forms 
simultaneously could potentially create a “hybrid 
megalopolis”, although it has not been observed in any of the 
case studies. 
The economic growth stimulated by HSR is not 
uniformly distributed within a megalopolis, resulting in 
winners and losers. HSR through the megalopolis formation 
contributes to economic development.  It may either spur new 
growth (catalytic role), or contribute to economic shifts 
through relocation of economic activity within the corridor 
(redistributive role), which may imply some growth, no growth 
or even negative growth for some.  The spatial distribution of 
any growth is non-uniform, which may essentially lead to 
urban areas that win at the expense of other areas.  
Role of induced traffic in the generation of economic 
growth is critical. The formation of a megalopolis seems to be 
driven mainly by the generation of more travel for commuting, 
business, leisure or other purposes. New growth is more likely 
to take place when HSR induces substantial levels of new 
demand by changing travel behavior of those who would not 
have traveled otherwise.  However, if the induced traffic is 
driven from within the population and businesses that 
relocated from other areas, the growth it leads to could be 
redistributed at the expense of cities that lost economic activity 
and population. 
The way that the urban areas are impacted by the new 
HSR is related to pre-existing conditions in the cities before 
the high speed connection. Case study findings have shown 
that cities with a strong economic base before the HSR 
construction seem to benefit from the HSR the most, while 
cities with smaller economies gain to a lesser extent or not at 
all.  HSR tends to favor urban areas with service and 
information exchange industry foci and less manufacturing 
and agriculture oriented areas. Other pre-existing factors that 
may maximize HSR’s positive impacts are compatibility with 
the conventional railway, inter-modal connectivity, tourist 
attractions, and station location in the city center. Cities not 
connected to HSR line directly are the biggest losers from this 
development, especially if they are not linked to HSR by 
conventional feeder services.  
Megalopolises or megaregions present the need for 
planning on a new spatial scale with new boundaries and 
linkages; and HSR links may be used to shape the direction 
of megalopolises within Portugal. Knowing the impacts of 
HSR on development can help to shape appropriate strategies 
within a megalopolis, for example in Portugal and in the US.  
For example, “the implementation of climate change strategies 
and programs” can be addressed more appropriately within the 
megalopolis “framework”.73  Moreover, since transport 
infrastructure investments such as HSR are essential in linking 
the urban areas into a megalopolis or megaregion, planning 
transport links may be used to shape the direction in which 
megalopolises are developed, specifically with respect to 
ensuring the development of the intermediate urban areas 
located in between the main stops, and urban areas not directly 
connected to high-speed lines.  This includes the planning of 
station locations, inter-modal connections and frequency of 
HSR service that may minimize the negative or redistribute 
development effects of HSR within the megalopolis. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
A3  Autobahn 3  
AF   Alfa Pendular 
CB   Deutsche Bahn  
CBD Central Business District 
CEF Chubu Economic Federation of Japan 
EHEZ “Extra Huge” Economic Zones 
HSR High-speed rail 
HST High-speed trains 
IC   Inter-City  
ICE  Inter-City Express  
LGV Ligne à Grande Vitesse  
RE  Regional Express 
SNCF  Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français  
TGV  Train à Grande Vitesse  
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ANNEX A 
FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: TIME-SPACE CHART FOR COMMUTING TIMES FROM/TO TOKYO BY MODE 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: TIME-SPACE CHART FOR COMMUTING TIMES FROM/TO PARIS BY MODE 
 
Notes: 
- Rail is for conventional (regional and inter-city) trains. 
- No air services available to Macon and Le Creusot.   
- No direct TGV service is available between Macon and Le Creusot. 
- No direct conventional rail link available between Paris-Macon. No conventional rail service runs between Le Creusot and Paris, and between Le Creusot and Lyon. 
Travel by conventional rail between Paris and Macon involves at least one transfer (via Dijon). Conventional trains serve Macon Centre station in Macon, which 
is different from the TGV station Macon-Loche. 
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FIGURE 3: TIME-SPACE CHART FOR COMMUTING TIMES FROM/TO FRANKFURT BY MODE 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: FUNDAMENTAL CHAIN OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF HSR THROUGH MEGALOPOLIS FORMATION 
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FIGURE 5: JAPAN MEGALOPOLIS FORMATIONS: TOKYO-OSAKA HSR CORRIDOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osaka Tokyo 
Kyoto Nagoya Yokohama 
80 min 
zone 
80 min 
zone 
Megalopolis 1: Tokyo-Yokohama-Shizuoka 
Megalopolis 2: Osaka-Kyoto-Nagoya 
 
Gains:  Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kyoto 
No impacts: Shizuoka (Shizuoka is served by Hikari Slower and less frequent trains) 
Losses:  Nagoya, cities outside of Shinkansen network 
Shizuoka 
Tokyo Yokohama Shizuoka Nagoya Kyoto Osaka
Frequency (trains/day) 173 173 66 173 173 173
Station served by 
conventional rail line
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Connection to airport No No No No No No
Primary industry sector 
focus
Services Shipping, Biotech Services Manufacturing IT/Tourism Services
 
Source: sketched by the authors based on the case study research findings (drawn not to scale). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: FRANCE MEGALOPOLIS FORMATION: PARIS-LYON HSR CORRIDOR 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paris 
Lyon 
Le Creusot 
Macon 
120 min 
Megalopolis: Paris-Lyon 
 
Gains:  Paris, Lyon, Macon 
No impacts: Le Creusot 
Losses:  cities not connected to TGV 
Paris Le Creusot Macon Lyon
Frequency (trains/day) 38-46  8-10  5-8 38-46
Station served by 
conventional rail line
Yes No No No
Connection to airport Yes No No Yes
Primary industry sector 
focus
Services Metallurgy
Shipping, 
Metallurgy
Services/R&D
 
Source: sketched by the authors based on the case study research findings (drawn not to scale). 
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FIGURE 7: GERMANY MEGALOPOLIS FORMATION: COLOGNE-FRANKFURT HSR CORRIDOR 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cologne 
Frankfurt 
Montabaur 
Limburg 
45 min 
Megalopolis: Frankfurt-Limburg-Montabaur 
 
Gains:  Frankfurt, Montabaur, Limburg  
No impacts: Cologne, Siegburg 
Losses:  cities not connected to ICE 
Siegburg/Bonn 
Frankfurt Limburg Montabaur Siegburg/Bonn Cologne
Frequency (trains/day) 32-33 14-15 14-15 14-15 32-33
Station served by 
conventional rail line
Yes No No Yes Yes
Connection to airport Yes No No No Yes
Primary industry sector 
focus
Services Services Services Services
Arts, media, 
manufacturing
 
Source: sketched by the authors based on the case study research findings (drawn not to scale). 
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FIGURE 8: TIME-SPACE CHART FOR COMMUTING TIMES FROM/TO LISBON: EXISTING MODES AND HSR 
 
 
  Note: AF – Alfa Pendular; Rail – conventional intercity services. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9: POSSIBILITIES OF MEGALOPOLIS FORMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
City A 
City B 
City d 
City b 
City c 
City a 
City A 
City d 
City b 
Form (1)  
City c 
City a 
City B 
Form (2)  
City A 
City d 
City b 
City c 
City a 
City B 
Form (3)  
 
 
 21 Copyright © 2011 by ASME 
ANNEX B 
TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1: GROWTH OF BUSINESS TRAVEL (1980-1985) 
 
 Mode Trip Origin Overall 
 Train Airplane Paris Region Lyon Region  
Growth Rate 151% -46% 20% 86% 56% 
Source: Roth, D. 1990. The TGV System: A Technical, Commercial, Financial and Socio-Economic Renaissance of the Rail Mode. Department of Systems, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.  
 
 
TABLE 2: COLOGNE-FRANKFURT CORRIDOR TRAFFIC MARKET SHARES BY MODE & TRIP PURPOSE (%):  
BEFORE AND AFTER 
 
Before the ICE (2001) 
Trip Purpose Rail Air Road Total 
Business 12.7 0.7 31.3 44.7 
Private 29.5 0.0 25.8 55.3 
Total 42.2 0.7 57.1 100.0 
 
After the ICE (2005) 
Trip Purpose Rail Air Road Total 
Business 29.4 0.0 36.5 65.9 
Private 36.8 0.0 29.2 65.9 
Total 66.2 0.0 65.7 131.9 
Note: Percentages are presented relative to year 2001. 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG. Matrix Analysis by Martin Thust of DB AG. Provided on 04/15/2010. 
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TABLE 3: HSR CORRIDORS COMPARISON BY COUNTRY 
 
 JAPAN 
Tokyo-Osaka Link 
(actual) 
FRANCE 
Paris-Lyon Link 
(actual) 
GERMANY 
Cologne-Frankfurt Link 
(actual) 
PORTUGAL 
Lisbon-Porto Link 
(expected)a 
Main Corridor Characteristics 
Date of Completion 1964 1981 2002 2015 
Route Length (km & miles) 515.4 km (343 miles) 425 km (264 miles) 177 km (110 miles) 297 km (185 miles) 
Current top operating speed (km/h & mi/h) 270 km/h; (168 mi/h); 210 km/h (130 mi/h) initially 300 km/h (186 mi/h) 320 km/h (199 mi/h) 300 km/h (186 mi/h) 
Technology type (trainsets) Shinkansen TGV ICE TGV 
Travel time between route end points (direct service) 2 hours 25 min  (4 hours before 1992) 2 hours 1 hour 10 min 1 hour 15 min 
Newly built line or upgrade Newly built Newly built Newly builtb Newly built 
Primary motivation Increase corridor capacity Increase corridor capacity Increase corridor capacity Increase corridor capacity 
Compatibility with conventional rail (track and trains) Non-compatible (“exclusive exploitation model”c) 
Compatible HST (“mixed 
high-speed model”c) 
Non-compatible (“exclusive 
exploitation model”)b 
Non-compatible (“exclusive 
exploitation model”c) 
Non-mixed use dedicated track or shared with 
freight/conventional trains 
Non-mixed use passenger 
dedicated 
Non-mixed use passenger 
dedicated 
Non-mixed use passenger 
dedicatedb 
Non-mixed use passenger 
dedicated 
Number of intermediate stops 4 (Nozomi trains) 8 (Hikari trains) 2 (Le Creusot, Macon) 
4 (Siegburg/Bonn, Montabaur, 
Limburg, FRA Airport) 
4 (Oeste, Leiria, Coimbra, 
Aveiro) 
Cities with stations shared with conventional trains 
(regional/intercity) All except Yokohama and Osaka Paris only 
Frankfurt, Cologne, 
Siegburg/Bonn 
Lisbon, Leiria, Coimbra, 
Porto 
Financing sources for construction World Bank loan and Japanese government French government 
EC initiative grant, German 
government 
EU, EIB loan, private sector 
(PPP), government 
Frequency of  least stops service per day 173 (4 stops) 30 (0 stops) 18 (1 stops) TBD 
Frequency at intermediate stops per day 173 (4 stops)d 8 (1 stop only) 14-15 (4 stops) TBD 
Observed Effects  
Air/Rail market share 85% rail, 15% air 90% rail, 10% air 100% rail, 0% air  
Ridership per year by HSR 150 million 20 million 9 million  
Level of induced demand High High (49%) High (~50%)  
Development impacts (zero sum  or net growth) on national 
scale Zero sum Zero sum Zero sum  
Notes: 
a  All decisions for Portugal have been made and are not changeable, except for frequencies. 
b German strategy to HSR deployment is generally by upgrading conventional line and tracks are generally shared with freight and conventional trains (“fully mixed model” according to Campos et al., 2007); 
Cologne-Frankfurt line was the first newly constructed HSR link with dedicated track not shared with freight or conventional trains. 
c  According to Campos et al. (2007) models. 
d  Japanese fastest HSR service between Tokyo and Osaka (Nozomi trains) stops at least at four intermediate stations.  The second fastest service (Hikari trains) makes eight intermediate stops, and the slowest 
service (Kodama trains) – 15 stops.  For comparison purposes above, we are considering the fastest Nozomi train services only.
 
